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MOVING AWAY FROM CERTAINTY: USING 
MEDIATION TO AVOID UNPREDICTABLE 
OUTCOMES IN RELOCATION DISPUTES 
INVOLVING JOINT PHYSICAL CUSTODY 
Abstract: This Note describes the frameworks used by the courts of vari-
ous states to modify joint physical custody plans when one parent wishes 
to relocate with the child to a different jurisdiction. The standards cur-
rently used by all states (variants of the “best interests of the child” stan-
dard) are too unpredictable, unfairly punish one parent with a substantial 
loss of parenting time, and fail to take into account alternative solutions 
that may be acceptable for all parties. Therefore, states should adopt a 
plan of mandated mediation, using litigation under the “best interests of 
the child” standard only when mediation utterly fails. This Note also ar-
gues for the increased use of guardians ad litem when such court deci-
sions become necessary. 
Introduction 
 In Bleak House, Charles Dickens’s narrator remarked that any hon-
orable practitioner in the Court of Chancery1 should warn clients, “Suf-
fer any wrong that can be done to you, rather than come here!”2 In-
deed, when the courts are asked to rule on relocation3 cases involving 
child custody, the results can be harsh and unpredictable, especially 
when the custodial arrangement allowed both parents to play equal 
roles in raising their children.4 We live in an increasingly mobile society 
                                                                                                                      
 
1 The several states use various terms to describe the court that hears child custody 
disputes, including “chancery court,” “probate court,” or “family court.” This Note refers 
to all such courts as “family courts” and their officers as “judges.” 
2 Charles Dickens, Bleak House 3 (Bantam Classics 2006) (1853). 
3 This Note uses “relocation” as a term of art referring to situations in which a custo-
dial parent seeks to change residences with the child, thus necessitating a change in the 
custodial agreement. See Sara P. v. Richard T., 670 N.Y.S.2d 964, 966 (Fam. Ct. 1998) (“The 
term ‘relocation’ has become a legal term of art for cases involving a proposed move by a 
custodial parent.”). 
4 See Gary A. Debele, A Children’s Rights Approach to Relocation: A Meaningful Best Interests 
Standard, 15 J. Am. Acad. Matrim. Law. 75, 78 (1998) (“[T]he concept of ‘best interests of 
the child’ is an amorphous concept that has been very difficult for courts, litigants, chil-
dren’s advocates, and mental health professionals to flesh out and apply.”); W. Dennis 
Duggan, Rock-Paper-Scissors: Playing the Odds with the Law of Child Relocation, 45 Fam. Ct. Rev. 
193, 193–94 (2007) (arguing that the state of the law in child relocation cases is a “mess” 
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in which, by the mid-1990s, one in five adults changed residences each 
year.5 Additionally, the realities of the current labor market require that 
adults be able and willing to travel long distances to secure employ-
ment.6 When one divorced parent decides to move out of state or far 
from the other parent, a previously established joint physical custody 
arrangement often becomes untenable.7 The party seeking to relocate 
must either negotiate with the other custodian to alter the custody 
agreement or seek a remedy from the courts.8 
 When adjudicating relocation cases, the family courts, in applying 
the “best interests of the child” standard, must balance one parent’s 
ability to continue a close parent-child relationship with the other par-
ent’s ability to seek economic and emotional benefits in a new domi-
cile, which may benefit the child as well.9 This Note focuses on the tests 
used by family courts to decide relocation cases in which both parents 
                                                                                                                      
and that judges, who merely guess at the correct solution, cannot possibly determine what 
is in the best interests of the child); Charles P. Kindregan, Jr., Family Interests in Competition: 
Relocation and Visitation, 36 Suffolk U. L. Rev. 31, 60 (2002) (arguing that the status of the 
law on relocation is in “disarray” and that courts are unable to find a “suitable procedural 
format for addressing the problem”). 
5 Burgess v. Burgess (In re Marriage of Burgess), 913 P.2d 473, 480 (Cal. 1996); see also 
Linda D. Elrod, National and International Momentum Builds for More Child Focus in Relocation 
Disputes, 44 Fam. L.Q. 341, 341, 342 & n.5 (2010) (providing some more recent statistics). 
6 Burgess, 913 P.2d at 480 (noting that, after a divorce, it is usually necessary for both 
parents to find employment, education, and the support of family and friends, requiring 
them to move away from the marital location); Kindregan, supra note 4, at 35–36 (noting 
that, as more women work outside the home and seek more distant employment and edu-
cational opportunities than in the past, parental relocation disputes have become more 
common). 
7 See Kindregan, supra note 4, at 55 (“Common sense would suggest that a distant relo-
cation changes the framework of the child’s relationship with both parents . . . .”); Paula 
M. Raines, Joint Custody and the Right to Travel: Legal and Psychological Implications, 24 J. Fam. 
L. 625, 656 (1985) (stating that “the possibility of creating or sustaining [a joint custody] 
arrangement is destroyed when one parent” moves far from the other parent). 
8 See infra notes 128–134, 185–209 and accompanying text. 
9 See, e.g., Sanford N. Katz, Family Law in America 114 (2003) (framing relocation 
disputes as balancing the benefits of the move with the child’s ability to remain in contact 
with the nonrelocating parent); cf. Fingert v. Fingert (In re Marriage of Fingert), 271 Cal. 
Rptr. 389, 392 (Ct. App. 1990) (stating that restricting the locations where a custodial 
mother can reside with her child would force her “to choose between her right to resettle, 
find new employment, start a new life[,] and retain custody of her child”); Judy S. Waller-
stein & Tony J. Tanke, To Move or Not to Move: Psychological and Legal Considerations in the 
Relocation of Children Following Divorce, 30 Fam. L.Q. 305, 315 (1996) (stating that “prohibit-
ing a move by the custodial parent may force that parent to choose between custody of his 
or her child and opportunities that may benefit the family unit” including new jobs, mar-
riages, and relatives’ support). 
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exercise joint physical custody over the child.10 The family courts face 
additional challenges when applying the best interests of the child 
standard to these cases, as both parents may have spent nearly equal 
amounts of time caring for the child and therefore would be equally 
qualified to continue raising the child.11 
 Part I of this Note compares the variations on the best interests of 
the child standard that family courts of several states used to adjudicate 
relocation disputes.12 This Part demonstrates how judges possess far 
more discretion when resolving joint physical custody cases than sole 
physical custody cases, making the outcomes of the former less predict-
able for litigants.13 Part II explains that the family courts, when apply-
ing their broad discretion to resolve joint custody disputes, often must 
choose one parent to receive sole physical custody, substantially curtail-
ing the other parent’s rights to raise the child.14 Alternatively, the judge 
may deny a parent the ability to relocate with the child, forcing that 
parent to choose between retaining custody of the child and enjoying 
the proposed benefits of relocation.15 Part III presents various alterna-
tive means of dispute resolution that allow parents to avoid an absolute 
loss of custody through compromise, mitigating the vicissitudes and 
emotional trauma of adversarial litigation.16 
 Finally, Section IV.A argues that mediation, in which an expert 
helps the parents devise their own solution to the relocation issue, of-
fers the best opportunity to resolve relocation disputes in a manner 
agreeable to both joint physical custodians.17 Section IV.B notes that if 
the parents utterly fail to compromise in altering or maintaining their 
parenting plan, a neutral arbiter must then decide the case.18 In such a 
situation, a family court judge, given broad discretion to act in the 
                                                                                                                      
10 For an explanation of the differences between joint and sole custody, see infra notes 
33–40 and accompanying text. 
11 See, e.g., Duggan supra note 4, at 198 (explaining that the most “nettlesome” reloca-
tion cases arise when both parents are “competent caretakers,” “fully involved” in their 
child’s life, and are able to cooperate with relatively few conflicts). Family courts have 
faced additional difficulties when same-sex parents relocate to jurisdictions that may not 
recognize the parental rights arising from their marriages or civil unions. See generally Deb-
orah L. Forman, Interstate Recognition of Same-Sex Parents in the Wake of Gay Marriage, Civil 
Unions, and Domestic Partnerships, 46 B.C. L. Rev. 1 (2004) (examining the parental rights of 
same-sex couples). 
12 See infra notes 20–127 and accompanying text. 
13 See infra notes 28–101 and accompanying text. 
14 See infra notes 128–184 and accompanying text. 
15 See infra notes 128–184 and accompanying text. 
16 See infra notes 185–209 and accompanying text. 
17 See infra notes 216–243 and accompanying text. 
18 See infra notes 244–249 and accompanying text. 
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child’s best interests, should rely on the report of a guardian ad litem 
(“GAL”) to decide with whom the child should reside.19 
I. The Best Interests of the Child 
 In all relocation cases, family courts apply the best interests of the 
child standard to decide if the child may relocate.20 The precise formu-
lation of this standard, however, varies by jurisdiction and whether the 
parents exercise sole or joint physical custody.21 Although courts will 
not allow a parent to relocate with a child if it is against the child’s best 
interests,22 courts may apply a presumption in favor of one parent23 or 
analyze the issue using lists of factors specific to that jurisdiction and 
type of custody.24 Generally, the formulation of this standard as applied 
to joint physical custody cases grants the family court judge far greater 
discretion than in sole custody cases, making the results less predictable 
for the litigants.25 Section I.A compares the formulations of the best 
                                                                                                                      
19 See infra notes 250–283 and accompanying text. 
20 See Debele, supra note 4, at 78 (stating the “common thread” of all relocation analy-
ses is that the “ultimate decision must be made in the best interests of the child”); Raines, 
supra note 7, at 656 (arguing that joint custody should be the default custodial plan and 
that all relocation cases should be decided by the best interests of the child); Merle H. 
Weiner, Inertia and Inequality: Reconceptualizing Disputes over Parental Relocation, 40 U.C. Da-
vis L. Rev. 1747, 1753 (2007) (stating that the standard used to decide relocation cases is 
“constant across time and space,” and that, since the nineteenth century, the child’s best 
interests has been the universal standard). 
21 See infra notes 54–127 and accompanying text. 
22 See, e.g., Burgess, 913 P.2d at 481–83 (stating that the noncustodial parent may pre-
vent the move by showing that it would be detrimental to the child’s welfare); Am. Law 
Inst., Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution: Analysis and Recommendations 
§ 2.17(4)(b) (2002) [hereinafter ALI Principles] (stating that, if the move is not in the 
best interests of the child, custody should be transferred to the noncustodial parent to 
prevent the child from moving); Kindregan supra note 4, at 42–46 (describing courts’ 
three different approaches to adjudicate relocation disputes and noting that, under all of 
these models, the child will not be permitted to relocate if it is against the child’s inter-
ests). 
23 See, e.g., Burgess, 913 P.2d at 481, 482 (stating that the sole custodial parent may relo-
cate without showing that the move is necessary, unless the noncustodial parent shows that 
the move will harm the child); ALI Principles, supra note 22, § 2.17(4)(a) (allowing the 
sole custodian to relocate freely, provided that there is a good faith reason for the move 
and that it will not harm the child). 
24 See, e.g., Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-6-108(c)(1)–(11) (West 2010) (listing factors to be 
taken into account); Mason v. Coleman, 850 N.E.2d 513, 518–19 (Mass. 2006) (indicating 
that factors to be taken into account differ in sole and joint custody cases); Tropea v. Tro-
pea, 665 N.E.2d 145, 150–51 (N.Y. 1996) (listing factors to be taken into account in all 
relocation cases); Yannas v. Frondistou-Yannas, 481 N.E.2d 1153, 1158 (Mass. 1985) (listing 
factors to be taken into account in sole custody cases); Sara P., 670 N.Y.S.2d at 967 (adding 
factors to sole custody test for use in joint physical custody cases). 
25 See infra notes 54–101 and accompanying text. 
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interests of the child standard used to decide sole physical custody cases 
in California, New York, and Massachusetts, and introduces the Ameri-
can Law Institute’s recommendations concerning the formulation used 
by these authorities to decide joint physical custody cases.26 Section I.B 
explains how some jurisdictions have attempted to introduce some 
predictability for the litigants in joint physical custody relocation cases 
by applying a presumption either for or against the relocation of the 
child, whereas other jurisdictions have decided to place both joint cus-
todians on equal footing in the interests of fairness to all parties.27 
A. Comparing the Predictability of Outcomes in Sole and Joint Physical  
Custody Relocation Cases 
 Many jurisdictions use a different formulation of the best interests 
of the child standard to decide sole custody cases than they use to de-
cide joint physical custody cases.28 In general, the courts are more per-
missive of relocation by a sole custodian than a joint custodian because 
the best interests of the child are more closely tied to the desires and 
fortunes of a sole legal caretaker than either one of two joint caretak-
ers.29 Accordingly, in joint physical custody cases in which both parents 
have played a significant role in the child’s life, courts will generally not 
assume that a joint custodian may unilaterally relocate with the child, 
but rather will engage in a more rigorous inquiry into the effect of the 
move on the child’s welfare.30 Therefore, in joint physical custody 
                                                                                                                      
 
26 See infra notes 28–101 and accompanying text. 
27 See infra notes 102–127 and accompanying text. 
28 Compare Burgess, 913 P.2d at 481–82 (stating that a sole custodian may freely relocate 
with the child, provided that the noncustodial parent cannot show that a change in cus-
tody is necessary to advance the child’s welfare), and Yannas, 481 N.E.2d at 1157–58 (giv-
ing great weight to the real advantage reaped by sole custodian’s relocation), with Mason, 
850 N.E.2d at 518–19 (stating that the advantage to the relocating parent is less compel-
ling in joint physical custody cases), and Brody v. Kroll, 53 Cal. Rptr. 2d 280, 282 (Ct. App. 
1996) (citing Burgess, 913 P.2d at 483 n.12) (stating that, in a joint physical custody case, 
the trial court must determine de novo which parent may decide the residence of the 
child). 
29 See Mason, 50 N.E.2d at 518–19 (explaining that the advantage reaped by one custo-
dial parent is less compelling in joint physical custody cases than in sole custody cases). 
30 Compare Burgess, 913 P.2d at 481–82 (stating that the sole custodial parent may relocate 
without showing that the move is necessary, unless the noncustodial parent shows that the 
move will harm the child), and ALI Principles, supra note 22, § 2.17(4)(a) (allowing the sole 
custodian to relocate freely, provided that there is a good faith reason for the move and it will 
not harm the child), with Brody, 53 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 282 (citing Burgess, 913 P.2d at 483 n.12) 
(stating that, in a joint physical custody case, the trial court must determine de novo which 
parent is to receive sole custody and the residence of the child without a presumption in 
favor of either parent), and ALI Principles, supra note 22, § 2.17(4)(c) (stating that, when 
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cases, the family courts have broader discretion than in sole custody 
cases to allow or deny the relocation of the child.31 
                                                                                                                     
 To decide whether to use the sole or joint physical custody formu-
lation of the best interests of child standard, the family court must first 
determine what sort of custody arrangement the parents exercise.32 
Traditionally, most divorcing couples with children have continued 
their relationship with the child through sole custody in which one 
parent provides the vast majority of childcare and assumes sole respon-
sibility for making important decisions in the child’s life.33 The noncus-
todial parent may see the child at specified times according to visitation 
rights.34 By contrast, under joint custody35 arrangements, the parents 
may share legal custody (the right to make decisions affecting the 
child), physical custody (the right to exercise the duties of everyday 
childcare), or both.36 Although joint legal custody is common today, 
joint physical custody—in which parents divide childcare responsibili-
ties approximately equally—remains somewhat rare37 and, in most ju-
risdictions, joint physical custody does not imply an equal sharing of 
responsibility but only that the child is assured “frequent and continu-
ing contact with both parents.”38 Some divorcing parents, however, en-
deavor to structure their joint custody relationship to equally divide 
day-to-day childcare duties, perhaps transferring the child between 
 
parents exercise equal responsibilities for childcare, there should not be a presumption for 
or against relocation, but rather the case must decided based on the best interests of the 
child). 
31 See infra notes 54–101 and accompanying text. 
32 See supra notes 28–30 and accompanying text. 
33 Katz, supra note 9, at 111. 
34 Id. 
35 Alternatives to sole custody have been given a variety of names including “shared 
custody,” “divided custody,” “alternating custody,” and “shifting custody,” but “joint cus-
tody” is the term most frequently used to describe an arrangement in which parenting 
responsibilities are split. Lewis Kapner, Joint Custody and Shared Parental Responsibility: An 
Examination of Approaches in Wisconsin and in Florida, 66 Marq. L. Rev. 673, 673–74 (1983). 
To avoid confusion, this Note uses the term “joint custody” or “joint legal custody” to de-
scribe a relationship in which both parents are able to make decisions for the child. This 
Note uses the term “joint physical custody” to signify a custodial plan in which childcare 
responsibilities are divided between both parents and both households function as the 
child’s primary residence. 
36 See Raines, supra note 7, at 626–27 (defining physical and legal custody as elements 
of a joint custody agreement). 
37 See Mamolen v. Mamolen, 788 A.2d 795, 801 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2002) (citing 
Pascale v. Pascale, 660 A.2d 485, 491 (N.J. 1995)) (noting that joint custody arrangements 
with an unequal division of childcare responsibilities were “quite common” in 2002, whe-
reas plans that divided responsibility for the child equally were rare). 
38 Raines, supra note 7, at 626–27 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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their households on a daily or weekly basis.39 Such joint physical cus-
tody plans have been lauded by scholars and judges for allowing chil-
dren to develop strong attachments to both of their parents.40 
 The custody agreements adopted at the time of divorce, however, 
are not always clearly identifiable to the courts as establishing joint or 
sole custody.41 To complicate matters, the actual responsibilities parents 
exercised do not always match what was agreed upon in the custody 
agreement or mandated in a custody order.42 Accordingly, some juris-
dictions place substance over form when deciding whether to analyze 
relocation cases as involving sole or joint custody.43 These courts look 
to the facts of each case, applying the joint physical custody standard 
only when both parents in fact share custodial responsibilities equally.44 
If one parent spends significantly more time with the child, that parent 
is often treated as a sole custodian in relocation cases.45 In practice, 
                                                                                                                      
 
39 See, e.g., In re Marriage of Smith, 665 N.E.2d 1209, 1210 (Ill. 1996) (recounting a 
joint physical custody plan whereby the children lived with the mother for five days in a 
row during the first and third weeks of the month and two and a half days during the sec-
ond and fourth weeks of each month and lived with the father the remainder of each 
week); Voit v. Voit, 721 A.2d 317, 320 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1998) (stating that, under 
the custody agreement, the child would live with the father from Thursday to Monday and 
with the mother for the rest of the week). 
40 See, e.g., Margaret F. Brinig & F.H. Buckley, Joint Custody: Bonding and Monitoring 
Theories, 73 Ind. L.J. 393, 393, 402 (1998) (discussing the benefits of joint physical custody 
plans before and after divorce); Raines, supra note 7, at 639–40, 642 (discussing several 
studies showing that joint custody plans that provide close contact with both parents pro-
mote the child’s welfare and the parent’s feelings of involvement better than sole custody 
plans). 
41 See Kapner, supra note 35, at 673–74 (noting the confusing variety of terms used to 
describe custodial plans and how variations of sole custody may be confused for joint cus-
tody plans). 
42 See Dupré v. Dupré, 857 A.2d 242, 257 (R.I. 2004) (recognizing the possibility that 
the sole custodian in the court’s decree may not be the child’s actual primary caretaker, 
and joint custodians may not actually be splitting responsibilities equally); Mamolen, 788 
A.2d at 798 (stating that labels used in custody arrangements are not “conclusive proof of 
the relationship’s inherent nature”); Wallerstein & Tanke, supra note 9, at 317 (noting that 
custodial plans can change over time and that one parent may become a de facto sole cus-
todian of the child despite a de jure agreement providing for joint physical custody). 
43 See, e.g., Mamolen, 788 A.2d at 798 (“Our family courts are courts of equity and are 
bound not by the form of agreements, only substance.” (citing Applestein v. United Bd. & 
Carton Corp., 159 A.2d 146, 154 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1960))). 
44 See infra notes 47–53 and accompanying text. But see Jaramillo v. Jaramillo, 823 P.2d 
299, 304, 309 (N.M. 1991) (deciding that, under a joint custody decree, parents have equal 
decision-making power and therefore stand on equal footing in relocation cases, even if 
one parent assumes a majority of everyday care). 
45 See, e.g., Altomare v. Altomare, 933 N.E.2d 170, 176 (Mass. App. Ct. 2010) (stating 
that the standard for sole custody cases should be used whenever one parent exercises a 
clear majority of custodial responsibility); ALI Principles, supra note 22, § 2.17(4)(a)–(c) 
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family courts have found such temporal distinctions difficult to make, 
and commentators have noted that this method may lead to arbitrary 
classifications in close cases.46 
                                                                                                                     
 In 2002, in Mamolen v. Mamolen, the New Jersey Superior Court, 
Appellate Division, remarked that equity courts are obligated to look to 
the true nature of the relationship, regardless of the labels used by the 
parties to describe it.47 In Mamolen, the court found that, although the 
parties used the “de rigeur” label of joint custody, in reality, only about 
twenty-nine percent of the parenting time was allocated to the father; 
therefore it did not exercise a “joint custody relationship.”48 Likewise, 
in 2004, the Supreme Court of Rhode Island noted in Dupré v. Dupré 
that custodial labels may not reflect reality, and that the trial judge must 
use discretion to determine if either parent exercises a majority of pa-
rental duties and responsibilities, taking into account both the time 
spent with the child and the quality of the relationship.49 
 Similarly, the Massachusetts Court of Appeals explained in the 2010 
case Altomare v. Altomare that the standard used for sole custody cases 
should be used whenever one parent exercises a clear majority of re-
sponsibility.50 By implication, the test used in joint custody relocation 
cases would be used when the parents divide physical custody approxi-
mately equally.51 Regardless of the labels used to describe the arrange-
ment in the custody order, Massachusetts judges must engage in a fac-
tual inquiry to determine the true nature of the parents’ relationships 
with the child.52 Like the court in Altomare, the California Court of Ap-
peal, in the 1997 case Whealon v. Whealon (In re Marriage of Whealon), dis-
tinguished between true joint physical custody, which would require 
 
(providing a different analytical framework for cases in which one parent “exercis[es] the 
clear majority of custodial responsibility custodial responsibility” and cases in which re-
sponsibilities are divided approximately equally (emphasis added)). 
46 See, e.g., Erinn R. Wegner, Comment, Should the Standards in “Move-Away” Cases Be Dif-
ferent for Sole and Joint Physical Custody?, 16 J. Contemp. Legal Issues 261, 266 (2007) (ar-
guing that any strict temporal distinction between sole and joint custody would be arbi-
trary and unrelated to the strength of the parent-child relationship and criticizing the 
California courts for determining that a father who spent four days per week with his chil-
dren was a joint physical custodian, whereas a father who spent three days per week with 
his children was not). 
47 788 A.2d at 798. 
48 Id. at 798–99. 
49 857 A.2d at 257. 
50 933 N.E.2d at 176. 
51 See id. (defining joint physical custody but applying the sole custody standard be-
cause parenting time was not divided equally). 
52 See id. (rejecting the joint custody label in this case based on an assessment of the 
parenting agreement’s substance and actual implementation). 
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frequent contact with the child approximately four or five days per 
week, and sole custody with liberal visitation rights, in which the father 
would care for the child one night per week and every other weekend.53 
 The American Law Institute (ALI) has promulgated a set of “prin-
ciples” to guide courts and legislatures in finding solutions to relocation 
disputes.54 Like the jurisdictions previously discussed,55 this proposal 
eschews formal labels for types of custody and instead differentiates be-
tween cases in which the relocating parent exercises a “clear majority” of 
responsibility for the child and cases in which the parents share respon-
sibilities approximately equally.56 If one parent exercises a clear majority 
of custodial responsibility, the ALI recommends that the court allow this 
parent to relocate with the child, provided that the move “is for a valid 
purpose, in good faith, and to a location that is reasonable in light of 
the purpose.”57 If that parent does not show that the move is in good 
faith or made for a valid purpose, the court may modify the custody or-
der, granting primary custody to the nonrelocating parent.58 The court, 
according to the ALI, should not allow a parent who has exercised less 
custodial responsibility than the other to relocate with the child, unless 
this plan is necessary to avoid harm to the child.59 
 If, however, both parents exercise approximately equal amounts of 
custodial responsibility, the ALI Principles recommend that courts be 
given wide discretion to modify the custodial plan to advance the best 
interests of the child.60 Unlike in sole custody cases, the court is not 
required to allow a move for any good-faith reason, but rather must 
“take[] into account all relevant factors” including the burdens and 
benefits to the child in the event of relocation.61 These factors include 
the quality of the child’s relationship with each parent, each parent’s 
ability to care for the child, the preferences of the child, the ability of 
the parents to work together, the child’s interest in living with siblings, 
                                                                                                                      
53 61 Cal. Rptr. 2d 559, 561, 562 (Ct. App. 1997) (citing Brody, 53 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 282). 
54 See Lance Liebman, Director’s Foreword to ALI Principles, supra note 22, at XIII (in-
dicating that the work was intended to provide guidance to legislatures and courts on the 
law of family dissolution, including divorce and child custody). 
55 See infra notes 43–53 and accompanying text. 
56 ALI Principles, supra note 22, § 2.17(4). 
57 Id. § 2.17(4)(a). 
58 Id. § 2.17(4)(b). 
59 Id. § 2.17(4)(d). 
60 See id. § 2.17(4)(c) (instructing judges to “take[] into account all relevant factors” to 
modify the custodial plan in accordance with the best interests of the child). 
61 Id. 
274 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 53:265 
and the practical difficulties of scheduling and transporting the child 
between residences.62 
 Like the ALI Principles, the California courts afford a sole custo-
dian wide latitude to relocate with the child.63 A sole custodian in Cali-
fornia may relocate with the child unless the noncustodial parent suc-
cessfully petitions the court to become a sole or joint custodian by 
showing that the move is against the child’s best interests.64 The Su-
preme Court of California, in the 1996 case Burgess v. Burgess (In re Mar-
riage of Burgess), ruled that, although the sole custodian need not show 
that the move is necessary for the child’s wellbeing, a noncustodial par-
ent wishing to prevent the move must show that a change in custody to 
favor the nonrelocating parent is “essential or expedient” to promote 
the child’s interests.65 Although the California courts look to all rele-
vant factors to determine which parent’s residence would better pro-
mote the child’s welfare, the primary basis of the court’s decision in 
sole custody cases will often be the continuity of the child’s relationship 
with its primary caretaker.66 The decision in Burgess was implicitly in-
tended to provide greater predictability in relocation cases, allowing 
custodial parents greater freedom to relocate in an increasingly mobile 
society.67 
 Such predictability is absent from the California courts’ method of 
resolving relocation cases involving joint physical custody.68 In a foot-
note to the decision in Burgess, the court stated that the statutory pre-
                                                                                                                      
62 ALI Principles, supra note 22, § 2.08(1). 
63 See Burgess, 913 P.2d at 480 (quoting In re Marriage of Ciganovich, 132 Cal. Rptr. 261, 
263 (Ct. App. 1976)) (“It has long been established that . . . the ‘general rule [is that] a 
parent having child custody is entitled to change residence unless the move is detrimental 
to the child.’”); ALI Principles, supra note 22, § 2.17(4)(a) (allowing the parent with a 
clear majority of responsibility to relocate the child for any broadly-defined “valid pur-
pose”). 
64 See Cal. Fam. Code § 7501(a) (West 2004); Burgess, 913 P.2d at 476, 482 (holding 
that, in custody determinations in which one party seeks to relocate, the custodial parent 
need not show the move is necessary, but may relocate unless the relocation violates the 
best interests of the child). 
65 913 P.2d at 481–82. 
66 Id. at 482–83. 
67 See id. at 480–81 (noting that one in five Americans changed residences every year, 
that such moves were necessary for securing employment or education, and that placing 
the burden of proof on the relocating parent to show that the move was necessary would 
undermine the public policy of preventing costly litigation about everyday decisions). 
68 See id. at 483 n.12 (stating that instead of using the general rule favoring the custo-
dial parent, the court should instead decide de novo what custody arrangement promotes 
the child’s best interests); Brody, 53 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 282 (stating, in a joint physical custody 
relocation case, that the trial court should have determined de novo what custody ar-
rangement would be best for the child (citing Burgess, 913 P.2d at 483 n.12)). 
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sumption that the custodial parent may relocate with the children will 
not apply in cases in which both parents share physical custody of the 
children.69 Instead the courts must determine de novo what arrange-
ment for primary custody is in the children’s best interests.70 A few 
months after the 1996 decision in Burgess, the California Court of Ap-
peals followed the directives of this footnote in Brody v. Kroll.71 In that 
case, the parents exercised joint physical custody, spending approxi-
mately equal amounts of time with their child.72 When the mother 
sought to move from California to Connecticut, the father petitioned 
the court for modification of the custody order.73 Following the foot-
note in Burgess, the court was unable affirm the child’s relocation, and 
remanded the case, instructing the trial court to review the custody or-
der de novo.74 
 Unlike California and the ALI, the Court of Appeals of New York, 
in the 1996 case Tropea v. Tropea, rejected an approach that would tip 
the scales of justice in favor of a sole custodian’s ability to relocate the 
child.75 In New York, all relocation cases are governed by the more flex-
ible and discretionary test articulated in Tropea, which requires the 
courts to determine, by a preponderance of the evidence, which pri-
mary residence would better promote the child’s welfare.76 The relocat-
ing parent—either a sole or joint custodian—bears the burden of proof 
to show that the move would be in the best interests of the child.77 The 
Tropea court listed several potential factors family courts should balance 
when making this decision.78 These factors included: the strength of 
the child’s relationship with each parent; the effect of the move on the 
                                                                                                                      
69 913 P.2d at 483 n.12. 
70 Id. 
71 See Brody, 53 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 282 (citing Burgess, 913 P.2d at 483 n.12) (stating that, 
because the parents shared custodial responsibilities equally, the court should have deter-
mined the issue of custody de novo, assessing the best interests of the child without using a 
presumption in favor of either parent). 
72 Id. at 281, 282. 
73 Id. at 281. 
74 Id. at 282 (citing Burgess, 913 P.2d at 483 n.12). 
75 665 N.E.2d at 151; see also Burgess, 913 P.2d at 480 (“It has long been established that 
. . . the ‘general rule [is that] a parent having child custody is entitled to change residence 
unless the move is detrimental to the child.’” (quoting Ciganovich, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 263)); 
ALI Principles, supra note 22, § 2.17(4)(a) (allowing the parent with a clear majority of 
responsibility to relocate the child for any broadly-defined “valid purpose”). 
76 See 665 N.E.2d at 150–52 (holding that, in all relocation cases, the courts should ap-
ply the best interests of the child analysis by considering several listed factors). 
77 See Murphy v. Peace, 899 N.Y.S.2d 493, 494 (App. Div. 2010) (mem.) (citing Tropea, 
665 N.E.2d at 151–52). 
78 665 N.E.2d at 151. 
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child’s relationship with the noncustodial parent; the feasibility of 
maintaining the relationship with the noncustodial parent; the custo-
dial parent’s reasons for seeking the move; and the economic, educa-
tional, and emotional benefits to the child of moving to the new loca-
tion.79 The court in Tropea allowed the family court judges to exercise 
their discretion when determining the weight to give each factor in 
each case.80 
 In 1998, a New York Family Court, in Sara P. v. Richard T., attempted 
to use this standard to decide a case in which the parents divided custo-
dial responsibility equally.81 Noting that this situation is rare,82 the court 
decided that the factors listed in Tropea provided little guidance.83 Al-
though the family court applied a Tropea-like analysis, weighing various 
factors to determine if relocation would be in the child’s best interests, 
the court decided to include additional factors not listed in Tropea.84 
The court found that the most important factors in this particular case, 
though not listed in Tropea, were the continued existence of a long-
standing joint custody plan, the child’s success in the local school dis-
trict, and the parent who is better able to respond to the child’s needs.85 
If, indeed, the Tropea factors can be so easily altered by the family courts, 
New Yorkers are left with little assurance that the outcome of their relo-
cation case will be based on any predictable standard, especially if they 
exercise joint physical custody.86 
 Like the New York courts, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial 
Court decided that relocation cases must be decided on a case-by-case 
basis, without automatically favoring one parent over the other.87 In 
1985, the Supreme Judicial Court articulated, in Yannas v. Frondistou-
Yannas, that its standard for sole custody relocation cases should be go-
                                                                                                                      
79 Id. 
80 Id. 
81 670 N.Y.S.2d at 964, 966. 
82 See id. at 966 (noting that the court was unable to find any reported relocation case 
in which the parents were truly equal caretakers of the child). 
83 Id. 
84 Id. at 967. 
85 Id. at 966–67. 
86 See id. at 967 (noting that the most compelling factors leading to the decision in this 
case were not included in the higher court’s list of factors to be taken into account). 
87 See Tropea, 665 N.E.2d at 151 (refusing to “view relocation cases through the prisms 
of presumptions and threshold tests that artificially skew the analysis in favor of one out-
come or another”); Yannas, 481 N.E.2d at 1158 (refusing to impose heightened burdens of 
proof or “identify[] constitutional rights in favor of one person against another” when 
assessing the interests of each person in the case). 
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verned by the best interests of the child.88 The Yannas court also re-
quired the relocating parent to show that the move is grounded in a 
good reason, or “real advantage” to the relocating parent and chil-
dren.89 Although this requirement places a greater burden on the relo-
cating parent, this burden is relatively easy to meet, as an advantage to 
the parent is usually considered to be related to the child’s welfare.90 
Indeed, in Yannas, the Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the lower 
court’s finding of a real advantage to the children because relocation to 
Greece would benefit the mother “financially, emotionally, and socially” 
and the children would also benefit from her improved situation.91 
 Once the relocating parent shows that a real advantage will accrue 
to the children, the family courts consider a variety of factors—none of 
which are controlling—to determine if the move is in the best interests 
of the child.92 These factors include the effects on the child’s “emo-
tional, physical, and developmental needs;” the adverse effects of limit-
ing the child’s association with the noncustodial parent; the benefits to 
the child and custodial parent resulting from the move; the “soundness 
of the reason for moving”; the extent to which the noncustodial parent 
will be deprived of parenting time; the fitness of the noncustodial par-
ent to exercise parenting rights; and the existence of a motive to de-
prive the noncustodial parent of parental rights.93 When addressing 
these factors, the family courts must weigh the interests of both parents 
as well as those of the child, but the child’s interests, including the real 
advantage from the move, are always given the greatest weight.94 Giving 
such great weight to the real advantage of the move—which may be 
only tangentially related to the child’s welfare—Massachusetts courts 
                                                                                                                      
88 See 481 N.E.2d at 1158 (requiring the relocating parent to show that the move will 
provide a “real advantage” and then that the move is in the child’s best interests). 
89 Id. 
90 See id. (stating that a real advantage may be established by showing “a good, sincere 
reason for wanting to remove to another jurisdiction”). Subsequent cases have found a real 
advantage when the custodial parent and child expect to reap emotional or financial bene-
fits from the move. See, e.g., Altomare, 933 N.E.2d at 176–77 (finding a real advantage in 
moving to a new town to avoid painful encounters with an adulteress); Abbott v. Virusso, 
862 N.E.2d 52, 56–57 (Mass. App. Ct. 2007) (finding a real advantage when the mother 
would benefit financially and socially by moving to Arizona to be with her fiancé); Wake-
field v. Hegarty, 857 N.E.2d 32, 37 (Mass. App. Ct. 2006) (finding a real advantage when 
the mother’s relocation would result in increased salary and greater proximity to her rela-
tives). 
91 481 N.E.2d at 1158. 
92 Id. 
93 Id. 
94 Id. 
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have often found that relocating with a sole custodian was in the child’s 
best interests.95 
 In 2006, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, in Mason v. 
Coleman, articulated a different standard to be used in joint custody cas-
es.96 The court noted that when both parents divide childcare responsi-
bilities equally there is less connection between the child’s best interests 
and the advantage to any one parent resulting from the move.97 Accord-
ingly, the court held that in cases in which neither parent exercises a 
clear majority of custodial responsibility, the court should deemphasize 
the benefits reaped by the relocating parent and instead focus solely on 
the best interests of the child.98 Although this approach would seem to 
eliminate what predictability the real advantage standard offered, the 
Mason court noted that, in joint physical custody cases, the court should 
attempt to maintain the status quo and deny any move that will impair 
the relationship between the child and the nonrelocating parent.99 The 
predictability of this standard, however, is undermined by the fact that 
the Massachusetts courts have no bright-line tests to determine whether 
parents exercise sole or joint physical custody100 or whether a move will 
disrupt the current custodial plan.101 
B. Distributing Burden of Proof in Joint Physical Custody Relocation Cases 
 Although joint physical custody relocation cases are decided by the 
best interests of the child standard,102 some jurisdictions apply pre-
                                                                                                                      
 
95 Id. at 1157–58 (stating that, although the child’s interests are “paramount,” they are 
closely tied to the advantages reaped by a custodial parent from the relocation (quoting 
Cooper v. Cooper, 491 A.2d 606, 612 (N.J. 1984))); see also Altomare, 933 N.E.2d at 176–77; 
Abbott, 862 N.E.2d at 56–57; Wakefield, 857 N.E.2d at 37. 
96 850 N.E.2d at 518–19. 
97 Id. at 519. 
98 Id. at 515, 518–19. 
99 See id. at 519, 520 (stating that the child’s welfare is best served by maintaining exist-
ing contact with both parents and indicating that the trial judge is to take into account any 
increases in travel time that may impair either parent’s ability to exercise existing respon-
sibilities when assessing the best interests of the child). 
100 See supra notes 51–52 and accompanying text. 
101 See infra notes 152–154 and accompanying text. 
102 See, e.g., Smith, 665 N.E.2d at 1213 (stating that, in an Illinois joint custody case, “the 
paramount question in a removal case is whether the move is in the best interests of the 
children” (citing In re Marriage of Eckert, 518 N.E.2d 1041, 1044 (Ill. 1988))); Jaramillo, 
823 P.2d at 303 (describing the best interests of the child standard as the “lodestar” for 
determining custody modifications); Chen v. Heller, 759 A.2d 873, 884 (N.J. Super. Ct. 
App. Div. 2000) (stating that, in a New Jersey joint custody case, the standard for modifica-
tion of custody is the best interests of the child); Watson v. Watson, 196 S.W.3d 695, 700 
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sumptions or burdens of proof that favor the nonrelocating parent.103 
Other jurisdictions place joint physical custodians on equal footing in 
relocation cases.104 The outcome of a joint custody relocation case will 
often depend on who bears the burden of proof, as the parents are 
otherwise equally situated, each having proven that they can adequately 
raise the child.105 Placing the burden of proof on the relocating party 
would thus make the outcome of the case more predictable, but, in the 
eyes of some courts and commentators, would be unfair to the relocat-
ing party.106 
 In Illinois, for instance, a relocating joint custodian is at a disadvan-
tage, as that parent must show that the child’s relationship with the oth-
er parent will not suffer as a result of even a long-distance move.107 In 
that state, all relocation cases are governed by the standard articulated 
by the Supreme Court of Illinois in the 1988 sole custody relocation case 
of In re Marriage of Eckert.108 Under the Eckert standard, relocation cases 
are decided by the best interests of the child.109 To reach that conclu-
sion, courts look at four factors: the likelihood that the proposed move 
                                                                                                                      
(Tenn. Ct. App. 2005) (stating that relocation cases must be decided based on the best 
interests of the child (citing Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-6-108(c) (West 2001))). 
103 See, e.g., Smith, 665 N.E.2d at 1213 (“The party seeking removal has the burden of 
proving it is in the children’s best interests.” (citing Eckert, 518 N.E.2d at 1044)); Connelly 
v. Connelly, 644 So. 2d 789, 793 (La. Ct. App. 1994) (noting that the party seeking to mod-
ify a custody order must show that a material change in circumstances has arisen since the 
previous order and that a modification is in the child’s best interests). 
104 See Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-6-108(c) (West 2010) (stating that the courts shall not 
apply a presumption in favor of either parent if they “are actually spending substantially 
equal intervals of time with the child”); Jaramillo, 823 P.2d at 309 (refusing to impose a 
presumption for or against either parent and requiring both to show what arrangement 
would be in the child’s best interests without placing the burden of proof on only one 
parent). 
105 See Mamolen, 788 A.2d at 797 (“Experience informs that the ultimate outcome of 
[relocation cases] often turns on the placing of the burden of persuasion.”); Kindregan, 
supra note 4, at 45 (suggesting that, though the best interests of the child test seems neu-
tral, the test may be weighted in favor of one party by imposing a greater evidentiary bur-
den on the relocating party). 
106 See, e.g., Jaramillo, 823 P.2d at 303, 304, 309 (holding that neither party deserves the 
benefit of a presumption when both have equal custodial responsibilities); Mamolen, 788 
A.2d at 797 (noting that the burden of proof in relocation cases often dictates the out-
come); Debele, supra note 4, at 76–77 (noting that a presumption in favor of one party 
ignores the interests of the other party). 
107 See Smith, 665 N.E.2d at 1214 (denying children’s relocation to New Jersey in part 
because it would make weekend visits with the father in Illinois “extremely difficult”). 
108 518 N.E.2d at 1045–46 (listing factors to determine the best interests of a child in a 
sole custody case); see Smith, 665 N.E.2d at 1213–14 (using Eckert standard in a joint custody 
case). 
109 518 N.E.2d at 1044. 
280 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 53:265 
will enhance the child and parent’s quality of life, the motives of the 
parent seeking the move, the motives of the parent resisting the move, 
and whether a reasonable visitation schedule can be reached after the 
move.110 The court in Eckert placed great weight on the rights of the 
nonrelocating parent, noting that a child’s best interests would be 
served by continuing its relationship with both parents.111 In a 1996 
joint physical custody case, In re Marriage of Smith, the Illinois Supreme 
Court, applying the Eckert factors, affirmed the order of the trial court 
that found that the mother, as relocating parent, failed to satisfy her 
burden of proof to show that the move would be beneficial to the child 
and that the father’s parenting time would not be affected.112 The trial 
court mentioned that the distances between the two states would make 
usual weekend visits impossible,113 implying that it would be nearly im-
possible to satisfy the fourth Eckert factor in cases involving long-distance 
moves.114 
 Similarly, in New Jersey, when parents share a joint physical custo-
dial relationship to a child, the courts, treating the case as a petition for 
change of custody,115 look to the best interests of the child.116 As in Illi-
nois, the formulation of this standard disadvantages the relocating par-
ent, who must bear the burden of proof to show that there has been a 
change in circumstances and that the interests of the child are better 
served by a change in the custodial arrangement.117 Once the relocat-
                                                                                                                      
110 Id. at 1045–46. 
111 Id. at 1045. 
112 665 N.E.2d at 1213, 1214–15. 
113 Id. at 1214. 
114 See id. (affirming the trial court’s finding that removal to a distant jurisdiction 
would impair weekend visits and therefore substantially impair the relationship between 
the children and the nonrelocating parent). 
115 Baures v. Lewis, 770 A.2d 214, 229 (N.J. 2001); see Mamolen, 788 A.2d at 796 (stating 
that, if the parties have a true shared custodial relationship, the court must modify the 
custodial arrangement to allow the child to be removed from the jurisdiction); Chen, 759 
A.2d at 884 (treating a relocation case primarily as a modification of joint custody); Voit, 
721 A.2d at 326 (same). 
116 Baures, 770 A.2d at 229. 
117 See Voit, 721 A.2d at 326, 327 (finding that the relocating father had not met his 
burden to show that the child’s interests would be better served by moving with him in-
stead of staying with the mother, despite noting that the relocating parent is “saddled” with 
the burden of proof and finding both parents equally qualified to care for their child); see 
also Smith, 665 N.E.2d at 1213, 1214 (noting that, in Illinois, the party seeking removal 
bears the burden of proof and finding that the relocating mother was unable to show that 
the father’s relationship with the children would not be impaired); Chen, 759 A.2d at 884, 
886 (allowing children to move to Texas with their mother because she met her burden of 
proof by submitting the testimony of two experts stating that such a move would be in the 
children’s best interests and that the children preferred to live with their mother). 
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ing parent shows such a change in circumstances, the New Jersey courts 
do not compare the status quo of joint custody with the potential for 
one parent to exercise sole custody, as that would make the burden im-
possible to meet.118 Instead, the court must treat the move as inevitable 
and choose one parent or the other as primary custodian.119 Finding 
that a relocating father failed meet his burden of proof to show a 
change in circumstances, the New Jersey Superior Court, in the 1998 
case of Voit v. Voit, simply refused to modify the joint custody agree-
ment, noting that, if the father decided to move, the mother would re-
ceive sole custody.120 
 Other states spread the burden of proof equally, making the out-
come of the case far less predictable.121 In New Mexico, for instance, the 
courts also resolve joint custody relocation disputes by the best interests 
of the child standard, but the parents stand on equal footing—without a 
presumption in favor of one or the other—both bearing the same bur-
den of persuading the court to rule in their favor.122 Similarly, in the 
2005 case Watson v. Watson, the Tennessee Court of Appeals ruled that 
relocation cases must be resolved through the inquiry outlined in the 
Tennessee relocation statute123 that provides that no presumption for or 
against either parent will be used when they spend approximately equal 
time raising the child.124 Thus both parents are situated equally, and the 
court is not allowed to impose a burden of proof that would give either 
party the benefit of the doubt.125 The statute then outlines eleven fac-
tors that the courts are to consider to assess the best interests of child, 
including the child’s preference, the emotional bonds between the par-
ent and child, the need for stability in the child’s life, and which parent 
is better situated to care for the child.126 Because both parties requested 
to be the primary custodian and it was impossible to continue the joint 
custody relationship, the appeals court in Watson, based on the above 
factors, affirmed the lower court’s decision; it allowed the child’s reloca-
                                                                                                                      
118 Voit, 721 A.2d at 327. 
119 Id. at 327, 329. 
120 Id. at 329. 
121 See, e.g., Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-6-108(c) (West 2010) (“No presumption in favor of 
or against the request to relocate with the child shall arise.”); Jaramillo, 823 P.2d at 309 
(ruling that both parties bear an equal burden to show that their proposed parenting plan 
is in the child’s best interests and no presumption for or against relocation is to be used). 
122 Jaramillo, 823 P.2d at 303, 304, 309. 
123 196 S.W.3d at 700. 
124 Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-6-108(c). 
125 See id. (stating that no presumption will be applied to favor either parent). 
126 Id. § 36-6-108(c)(1)–(11). 
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tion, granting primary custody to the mother during the school year 
and allowing the child to reside with the nonrelocating father during 
the summer.127 
II. Altering Joint-Custodial Plans Through Litigation 
 When applying the best interests of the child standard to decide a 
joint physical custody relocation case, family court judges often must 
choose between two imperfect solutions: alter the custodial plan to 
grant sole custody to one parent or deny a parent permission to relo-
cate with the child.128 As noted above, it is easier for sole custodians—
or primary physical custodians129—to relocate with their children or 
prevent a noncustodial parent from relocating with the children than 
for joint physical custodians.130 Therefore, joint physical custodians will 
often ask to be declared sole custodians when litigating relocation cas-
es.131 Believing that two parents are better than one and that children 
benefit from familial stability, the family courts, to the extent possible, 
try to retain the status quo by continuing the joint physical custody ar-
rangement.132 When this is impossible due to the distance of the move, 
the courts are often forced to choose one parent to be a sole or pri-
mary physical custodian, thereby reducing the rights and access to the 
                                                                                                                      
127 196 S.W.3d at 702–03. 
128 See, e.g., Mason v. Coleman, 850 N.E.2d 513, 516 (Mass. 2006) (stating that the joint-
custodial father petitioned the court to receive sole physical custody and an injunction 
forbidding the mother to move with the children, whereas the mother also petitioned for 
sole custody and the court’s permission to relocate); In re Marriage of Smith, 665 N.E.2d 
1209, 1210 (Ill. 1996) (explaining that the mother petitioned the court for sole custody as 
well as permission to relocate and that the father also sought sole custody of the children). 
129 As noted previously, some joint-custodial plans allow both parents to make deci-
sions affecting the child, but allow only one parent to be the child’s primary caretaker; the 
parent that spends the majority of time raising the child is sometimes referred to as a 
“primary physical custodian” under a joint custody plan. See supra notes 35–38 and accom-
panying text. 
130 See supra notes 28–101 and accompanying text. 
131 See, e.g., Mason, 850 N.E.2d at 516 (stating that both joint custodians sought sole 
custody to allow or prevent the child’s relocation); Smith, 665 N.E.2d at 1210 (explaining 
that each joint custodian sought sole custody to allow or prevent the mother’s move). 
132 See Raines, supra note 7, at 656 (arguing that relocation should rarely be allowed 
under joint custody plans as the child is negatively impacted by the stress of moving away 
from friends and family); Wallerstein & Tanke, supra note 9, at 311–12 (noting that judges 
often operate under an irrefutable presumption that a child’s access to both parents is in 
the child’s best interests, but arguing that the benefits of this arrangement depend on the 
quality and depth of the relationship with each parent); see also Voit v. Voit, 721 A.2d 317, 
327, 329 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1998) (finding that the continuation of the relationship 
with both joint physical custodians would be in the best interests of the child, and there-
fore refusing to alter the custody order). 
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child of the other parent.133 Some commentators have noted that this 
drastic change in family situation creates stress for both the parent, who 
is deprived of custody by the courts, and the child, who loses frequent 
contact with one parent.134 
 Section II.A demonstrates the variety of ways that jurisdictions have 
attempted to define the distance at which a joint physical custody plan 
is no longer viable and the courts must intervene, granting one parent 
sole physical custody or permission to relocate with the child.135 Sec-
tion II.B discusses several joint physical custody relocation cases that 
demonstrate how judges have decided to deprive one parent of custo-
dial rights in an effort to approve or deny the relocation.136 
                                                                                                                     
A. Distances That Necessitate a Change in Custody 
 Although some relocation cases arise when one parent seeks to 
move across the country,137 or even to another country,138 other cases 
arise from relatively short-distance moves within a state or to a neigh-
boring jurisdiction.139 When a parent seeks to move only a short dis-
tance away, family courts will try to maintain the current type of cus-
tody, if possible.140 When the parent seeks to move so far away that the 
 
133 See Philip M. Stahl, Complex Issues in Child Custody Evaluations 84 (1999) 
(“The sad reality in most relocation cases is that one parent does gain, one parent does 
lose, and the child almost always suffers, no matter the outcome.”); Duggan, supra note 4, 
at 194 (explaining how the process and language of litigation inspires parents to engage in 
an all-or-nothing battle for sole custody). 
134 See Duggan, supra note 4, at 196–97 (explaining that litigation creates deep-rooted 
feelings of animosity between the parents who compete for custody, causing psychological 
harm to the child); Raines, supra note 7, at 649, 651, 654 (citing several studies showing 
that children benefit from continued relationships with both parents and that children are 
negatively impacted by the stress of moving away from a stable home and the reduction of 
time spent with one parent). 
135 See infra notes 137–158 and accompanying text. 
136 See infra notes 159–184 and accompanying text. 
137 See, e.g., Voit, 721 A.2d at 319 (describing the father’s move from New Jersey to Ari-
zona). 
138 See, e.g., Yannas v. Frondistou-Yannas, 481 N.E.2d 1153, 1155 (Mass. 1985) (describ-
ing the mother’s move to Greece). 
139 See, e.g., Mason, 850 N.E.2d at 515–16 (assessing the mother’s move from Massachu-
setts to New Hampshire); Burgess v. Burgess (In re Marriage of Burgess), 913 P.2d 473, 476 
(Cal. 1996) (assessing the mother’s move within California, about forty miles away). 
140 See, e.g., Tropea v. Tropea, 665 N.E.2d 145, 146, 152 (N.Y. 1996) (maintaining the 
sole physical custody plan because the planned move would still allow for frequent and 
continued visitation). 
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current custodial plan becomes untenable, the court must decide how 
it will alter the custodial plan to account for the distance.141 
 Some jurisdictions use a bright-line test to determine when the 
courts must intervene in relocation cases, relying on statutes that spec-
ify a minimum distance beyond which either the other parent or a fam-
ily court must approve of the child’s relocation.142 In Florida, for in-
stance, “relocation” is defined as a move by a parent of at least fifty 
miles from a previous residence.143 In Arizona, if both parents are enti-
tled to custody or parenting time, the relocating parent must provide 
notice to the other parent for any relocation outside of the state or 
more than one hundred miles within the state.144 
 Other jurisdictions use a more flexible standard, finding a change 
to the custodial plan necessary only when it will be disrupted by the 
move.145 This eminently pliable standard is generally decided at the 
discretion of the trial judge, producing unpredictable results that some 
commentators find absurd.146 For instance, in 1996, in Tropea v. Tropea, 
the New York Court of Appeals held that a mother who had sole cus-
tody of her children could move to Schenectady, New York, a two-and-a-
half-hour journey from the home of their noncustodial father in Syra-
cuse, New York.147 Although this distance would make midweek visits 
impossible, the court ruled that the sole custody plan could remain in-
tact, as this distance still allowed for “frequent and extended visita-
tion.”148 Similarly, in 1996, the Supreme Court of California, in Burgess 
v. Burgess (In re Marriage of Burgess), allowed the mother, as primary cus-
                                                                                                                      
141 See, e.g., Chen v. Heller, 759 A.2d 873, 885–86 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2000) (not-
ing that the mother’s move from New Jersey to Texas necessitated a change in the custo-
dial plan and granting the mother primary physical custody of the children). 
142 E.g., Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 25-408(B) (2007 & Supp. 2010) (West); Fla. Stat. 
Ann. § 61.13001(1)(e) (West Supp. 2011). 
143 Fla. Stat. Ann. § 61.13001(1)(e). 
144 Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 25-408(B). 
145 See, e.g., Burgess, 913 P.2d at 481–83 (stating that bright-line rules are inappropriate 
in relocation cases and that existing custody arrangements need not be scrutinized by the 
courts unless the noncustodial parent shows a substantial change in circumstances that 
renders a change in custody “essential or expedient” to protect the child’s welfare); Tropea, 
665 N.E.2d at 150–51 (rejecting bright-line tests and ruling that relocation cases must be 
assessed on their particular facts, taking into account the effect that the relocation will 
have on the visitation by the noncustodial parent). 
146 See Duggan, supra note 4, at 201, 203–04 (finding it absurd that, in both Burgess and 
Mason, courts would consider whether an increase of less than an hour of travel time would 
be too disruptive to the current custodial plan). 
147 665 N.E.2d at 146, 152. 
148 Id. 
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todial parent, to relocate within the state with her children.149 In that 
case, however, the distance of the proposed move was only forty miles, 
showing that the California courts are willing to assess whether such a 
short distance will render a sole custody plan untenable.150 
 Logically, when joint physical custodians alternate their duties on a 
daily basis, relocations of short distances, as in Burgess, would disrupt the 
current custodial plan.151 In 2006, in Mason v. Coleman, the Massachu-
setts Supreme Judicial Court prohibited a joint-custodial mother from 
moving from Chelmsford, Massachusetts to Bristol, New Hampshire,152 
approximately a seventy-five-minute drive from the joint-custodial fa-
ther’s home.153 The Mason court, however, provided no clear guidelines 
for this determination, noting that not all relocations outside of the 
state will impair the joint custody relationship; the trial judge must de-
cide, based on all of the circumstances, whether an increase in travel 
time or cost will significantly impair either party’s ability to exercise their 
custodial responsibilities after the relocation.154 
 Mason additionally raises the possibility that parties exercising joint 
custody may take affirmative steps to curtail the trial court’s broad dis-
cretion to determine what distance necessitates a change in custody.155 
In that case, the parents stipulated in their initial custody agreement, 
which was later merged into their divorce decree, that either parent 
could move within twenty-five miles of Chelmsford, Massachusetts.156 
Therefore, when the father decided to move from Chelmsford to Na-
shua, New Hampshire, a distance of approximately seventeen miles, the 
parents’ custody plan was allowed to continue uninterrupted.157 Nego-
tiating acceptable boundaries before a move is planned may provide a 
                                                                                                                      
149 913 P.2d at 476. 
150 See id. (noting that the proposed new domicile would be only forty miles away). In a 
reductio ad absurdum, one commentator noted that, per this logic, courts might entertain a 
relocation dispute when one parent seeks to move from Greenwich Village to Harlem, a 
journey that would take about the same amount of time as the drive in Burgess. Duggan, 
supra note 4, at 201. 
151 See Mason, 850 N.E.2d at 518 (describing how joint physical custody requires con-
stant cooperation to schedule activities, arrange for transportation, and make quotidian 
decisions). 
152 Id. at 515–16. 
153 Duggan, supra note 4, at 204. 
154 850 N.E.2d at 519–20. 
155 See id. at 515 (noting that parties had previously agreed that they would live within 
twenty-five miles of Chelmsford, Massachusetts). 
156 Id. 
157 See id. (noting that the mother did not file suit to object to the father’s move 
though she objected privately). The court did not address what would have been decided 
if the mother petitioned the court to block his relocation. See id. 
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means to avoid conflict when, as in Mason, one party is surprised by the 
other’s sudden desire to relocate.158 
B. The Risk of Losing Custody Through Litigation 
 Whenever the judge modifies a custodial plan due to relocation of 
a parent, one party will benefit by receiving greater access to the child 
and the other will suffer a loss of significant time with the child.159 If a 
court finds that the move will render the current joint physical custody 
plan untenable and that it would be in the child’s best interests to move 
with the relocating parent, the court will often alter the custodial ar-
rangement to grant the relocating parent primary physical custody.160 
In 2005, in Watson v. Watson, the Tennessee Court of Appeals affirmed 
the trial court’s finding that the child’s welfare would be best served by 
living with his mother, who sought to move to a different city in Ten-
nessee.161 The court, finding that the mother had already moved and 
thus that the joint physical custody arrangement could not continue,162 
designated the mother as the primary residential parent.163 The court 
decided that the child should live with the mother during the school 
year and with the father during the summer.164 Similarly, in the 2000 
Superior Court of New Jersey, Appellate Division, case of Chen v. Heller, 
the court found that it would be in the best interests of the children to 
move with their mother from New Jersey to Texas and granted the 
mother primary residential custody, thus altering the prior equal divi-
sion of custodial responsibility.165 In both of these cases, the courts 
forced the fathers of the children, who hitherto equally divided child-
                                                                                                                      
158 See id. (noting that the mother had little advanced notice of the father’s move to 
Nashua but did not file suit to prevent it). 
159 See Stahl, supra note 133, at 84 (“The sad reality in most relocation cases is that 
one parent does gain, one parent does lose, and the child almost always suffers, no matter 
the outcome.”). 
160 See, e.g., Chen, 759 A.2d at 885, 886 (altering the joint physical custody arrangement 
by giving the mother primary physical custody and thus allowing her to relocate the chil-
dren to Texas); Watson v. Watson, 196 S.W.3d 695, 700, 703 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2005) (desig-
nating the mother as primary residential parent so that the children would be allowed to 
live in her new domicile during the school year). 
161 196 S.W.3d at 700, 703. 
162 Id. at 702–03. 
163 Id. at 703. 
164 Id. 
165 759 A.2d at 885, 886. 
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care responsibilities with the mothers, to accept a less prominent role 
in the lives of their children.166 
 Conversely, family courts may find that relocation will disrupt the 
child’s ties to friends and family, especially the nonrelocating parent; 
thus, the child’s interests are best served by remaining in the current, 
stable place of residence.167 In such cases, the courts often view the re-
location of one parent as inevitable, rendering the status quo unten-
able.168 To prevent the child from relocating, the courts grant the non-
relocating parent primary physical custody, subject to visitation by the 
relocating parent.169 In this situation, the relocating parent must accept 
the more circumscribed role mandated by the court.170 For instance, in 
the 1994 case Connelly v. Connelly, the Court of Appeal of Louisiana af-
firmed the trial court’s grant of sole custody to the father, subject to 
visitation by the mother, after she had moved to Virginia.171 The trial 
court had found that staying with the father in Louisiana, where the 
                                                                                                                      
166 See id. at 886 (explaining that the move and change in custody will reduce the fa-
ther’s day-to-day interaction with his children to visits during school breaks and daily 
phone and computer/video conversations); Watson, 196 S.W.3d at 697, 703 (describing 
how the previous plan of alternating physical custody of the child daily would be replaced 
by a plan in which the child resides primarily with the mother during the school year and 
primarily with the father during the summer months). 
167 See, e.g., Connelly v. Connelly, 644 So. 2d 789, 797 (La. Ct. App. 1994) (affirming 
that the move would be detrimental to the child as he would lose the stable environment 
of his home city, school, friends, and family); Sara P. v. Richard T., 670 N.Y.S.2d 964, 967 
(Fam. Ct. 1998) (stating that “[u]ndoubtedly, the best arrangement for [the child] would 
be for her mother to return to Rochester and continue the equal parenting arrangement” 
and that an important factor in the analysis is that the child is settled and doing well in the 
local school); see also Raines, supra note 7, at 656 (arguing that relocation should rarely be 
allowed under joint custody plans as the child is negatively impacted by the stress of chang-
ing residences and losing contact with one parent); cf. Voit, 721 A.2d at 327 (indicating that 
it would be impossible to show that being raised by one parent after the move would be 
better for the child’s welfare than continuing to be raised by both parents in the current 
domicile). 
168 See, e.g., Voit, 721 A.2d at 327 (“Furthermore, for purposes of these proceedings, the 
court assumes that [the father] will move.”); Sara P., 670 N.Y.S.2d at 967 (noting that the 
mother has already moved and has no intention to reside in New York again). 
169 See, e.g., Connelly, 644 So. 2d at 795–97, 799 (affirming the trial court’s finding that 
relocation would be against the child’s best interests and therefore awarding the father 
sole custody subject to visitation by the mother); Sara P., 670 N.Y.S.2d at 967–68 (awarding 
the father primary physical custody, subject to substantial blocks of visitation time with the 
mother, because it was in the child’s best interests to remain in New York with her father). 
170 See, e.g., Connelly, 644 So. 2d at 791, 799 (reducing the relocating mother’s role 
from primary residential parent under a joint custody plan to noncustodial parent with 
visitation rights); Sara P., 670 N.Y.S.2d at 968 (reducing the joint-custodial mother’s role 
from approximately one-half of childcare responsibilities to visitation during holidays and 
school recesses). 
171 644 So. 2d at 792, 799. 
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child was engaged in extracurricular activities and had many close 
friends and relatives, would better promote the child’s welfare than 
moving with his mother to Virginia, where he had only one friend and 
no relatives.172 Similarly, in the 1998 case of Sara P. v. Richard T., the 
Family Court of Monroe County, New York, found that the child’s best 
interests would be promoted by remaining in New York with her friends 
and both parents.173 As the mother was unwilling to return from South 
Carolina, the court maintained the decree authorizing joint physical 
custody but set the child’s primary residence with the father and 
granted him significantly greater rights to spend time with the child.174 
 In some jurisdictions, when the move has yet to occur and is not 
considered to be inevitable, the courts may simply decide to deny per-
mission to relocate the child, thereby forcing the relocating parent ei-
ther to surrender joint-custodial rights or to abandon the plan to 
move.175 In 2006, in Mason v. Coleman, the Massachusetts Supreme Judi-
cial Court noted that, in joint physical custody cases, a child’s interests 
will typically favor continuing the child’s close relationship with both 
parents.176 Unsurprisingly, the court in Mason affirmed the family 
court’s ruling that it would not be in the children’s best interests to be 
“uproot[ed]” from their father’s care and superior school system if they 
were to move to New Hampshire.177 The Supreme Judicial Court, 
through affirming the family court’s order denying permission for the 
children to relocate, attempted to maintain the status quo to the detri-
ment of the mother who sought to live near her parents.178 
 The 1996 Illinois Supreme Court case of In re Marriage of Smith 
provides an example of a joint custody case in which both parents re-
                                                                                                                      
172 Id. at 797. 
173 670 N.Y.S.2d at 967. 
174 Id. at 967–68. 
175 See Mason, 850 N.E.2d at 516–17, 520 (continuing a joint custody plan and denying 
the mother permission to relocate her children to New Hampshire when the move had 
not yet occurred); Davis v. Davis, 970 P.2d 1084, 1086, 1088 (Nev. 1998) (affirming the 
denial of the mother’s petition to relocate the children to Florida when the mother had 
not yet moved); Smith, 665 N.E.2d at 1211, 1214–15 (denying the mother permission to 
relocate to New Jersey with her children before the mother had moved); Fingert v. Fingert 
(In re Marriage of Fingert), 271 Cal. Rptr. 389, 392 (Ct. App. 1990) (stating that denying a 
mother permission to relocate with her child would force her “to choose between her right 
to resettle, find new employment, start a new life and retain custody of her child”). 
176 850 N.E.2d at 519. 
177 Id. at 520, 521. 
178 See id. at 515–16, 519–20 (denying the mother’s relocation with children to her par-
ent’s residence because it would be in the children’s best interests to continue cultivating a 
close relationship with their father). 
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ceived an unfavorable judgment.179 As in Mason, the Smith court af-
firmed the lower court’s decision denying permission for the mother to 
relocate with her children.180 The court decided that she could not 
bring her children to live in her new spouse’s home in New Jersey be-
cause the move would be too stressful for the children and would im-
pair their relationship with their father in Illinois.181 The children’s fa-
ther, however, won a pyrrhic victory, losing his status as joint 
custodian.182 Despite enjoining the children’s move, the lower court 
granted sole custody to the mother, finding that the children were ne-
gatively impacted by the hostility that their custody plan fostered.183 
This harsh result left the father with significantly less right to raise the 
children than he had before the litigation and forced the mother—now 
the sole custodian of the children—to abandon her plan to live with 
her new spouse in New Jersey.184 
III. Non-Adversarial Resolutions 
 In relocation cases, decisions based on the pliable best interests of 
the child standard can fundamentally alter the lifestyle and family dy-
namic of joint custodians, diminishing the role of one parent in the 
child’s life or forcing a parent to choose between retaining custody or 
seeking the emotional and financial benefits of relocation.185 This has 
troubled some commentators who assert that the mental health of di-
vorced parents and their children is best promoted by affording them 
stability and agency in their affairs.186 Furthermore, family court judges 
often know little about the intimate details of the family’s relationship, 
and thus are limited in their ability to alter joint physical custody plans 
                                                                                                                      
179 See 665 N.E.2d at 1212, 1214–15 (depriving the father of joint-custodian status and 
forbidding the mother from relocating). 
180 See id. at 1214–15; see also Mason, 850 N.E.2d at 520, 521. 
181 Smith, 665 N.E.2d at 1213–15. 
182 Id. at 1210, 1212. 
183 Id. (noting that this issue was not appealed). 
184 See id. at 1210, 1212, 1214–15 (reducing the father’s status from joint physical cus-
todian to noncustodial parent and denying the mother’s request to move to her spouse’s 
New Jersey home). 
185 See supra notes 159–184 and accompanying text. 
186 See Duggan, supra note 4, at 196; Raines, supra note 7, at 654–55 (stating that litigat-
ing relocation cases is expensive and exposes the parties to loss of joint-custodian status 
and parenting time); id. at 649, 651, 654 (citing several studies showing that children ben-
efit from continued relationships with both parents and that children are negatively im-
pacted by the stress of moving away from a stable home and the reduction of time spent 
with one parent). 
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to best fit the changing needs of the family in relocation cases.187 To 
mitigate these concerns, many states have experimented with alterna-
tive means of dispute resolution in child custody cases, including set-
tlement, mediation, and the use of guardians ad litem (“GALs”).188 
 GALs are sometimes appointed by a family court judge to inde-
pendently investigate the facts of a child custody case and recommend 
to the judge what type of custodial plan would likely fulfill the needs of 
the child and family.189 The judge, however, makes all final decisions 
concerning the custodial plan.190 GALs are often trained in the sciences 
of psychology, social work, or child development, as well as the law of 
child custody, and thus are able to provide the judge with an expert 
opinion as to what would be best for a particular child’s development.191 
Another benefit to using GALs is that they have more extensive fact-
finding powers than a judge, and thus can better understand the prob-
lems and potential solutions in relocation cases.192 GALs are able to visit 
the child at home, observe day-to-day interactions with parents, and in-
terview all of the relevant people in the child’s life.193 The use of GALs, 
however, does not change the fact that a judge retains broad discretion 
to determine which parent will win or lose the case.194 
 If they wish to avoid adjudication by an outsider entirely, joint-
custodial parents may instead privately alter their custody plans to miti-
gate the effects of relocation or to make alternative arrangements that 
best fit the needs of all parties.195 Generally, statutes or provisions in the 
custody arrangement that govern relocation procedures require a relo-
cating custodial parent to notify the other parent of intentions to 
move.196 Some states encourage the parents to attempt such a settle-
                                                                                                                      
 
187 See Duggan, supra note 4, at 196 (stating that a family court judge’s fact-finding ca-
pacity is limited by courtroom procedure and that parents, who always know more about 
their children, are better able to promote their children’s interests). 
188 See infra notes 189–209 and accompanying text. 
189 Katz, supra note 9, at 109. 
190 See Tara Lea Muhlhauser, From “Best” to “Better”: The Interests of Children and the Role of 
a Guardian ad Litem, 66 N.D. L. Rev. 633, 640 (1990) (“In all cases, the weight given the 
[GAL’s] recommendation is purely discretionary.”). 
191 Katz, supra note 9, at 109. 
192 See id. (describing a GAL’s ability to investigate a child’s lifestyle out of court). 
193 Id. 
194 See Muhlhauser, supra note 190, at 640. 
195 See Duggan, supra note 4, at 193, 210 (encouraging parents to settle relocation dis-
putes to avoid litigation under unpredictable standards). 
196 See, e.g., Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 25-408(B) (2007 & Supp. 2010) (West) (requiring 
relocating parent to give the other custodial parent sixty days’ notice before moving); 
Katz, supra note 9, at 113 (noting that the divorce decree may provide for alternative pro-
cedures in the event of relocation); ALI Principles, supra note 22, § 2.17(2) (requiring 
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ment to avoid litigation.197 As the parents spend each day with the child 
and intimately know the child’s needs, they are better situated than a 
judge, who must rely on a formal, litigious fact-finding process, to craft 
a custodial plan that will promote the child’s best interests.198 Privately 
altering custody plans benefits both parents and their children, as it 
saves them the emotional rollercoaster and expenses of litigation.199 
Furthermore, this solution is favorable to both parties in that it avoids 
loss of custody against the parent’s wishes through litigation.200 
 Ideally, parents could negotiate a solution on their own as part of 
the notification process.201 When joint physical custodians spend ap-
proximately equal time raising the child, the parents are required to 
cooperate to serve the child’s best interests, continually making joint 
decisions that affect the child’s welfare.202 Although it would seem that 
these parents should be able to amicably alter their custodial plan in 
light of relocation, several commentators have observed that relocation 
disputes—even among joint custodians—are particularly unlikely to 
settle, as both parents may wish to continue as equal or even primary 
caregivers to the child.203 
                                                                                                                      
 
that the relocating parent give the nonrelocating parent sixty days advance notice of relo-
cation and a proposal for how the custodial arrangements should change). 
197 See, e.g., Fla. Stat. Ann. § 61.13001(2) (West Supp. 2011) (stating that, if all per-
sons entitled to access to or time-sharing with the child agree to the relocation and provide 
for a new schedule for custody or visitation, then there is no need to hold an evidentiary 
hearing). 
198 See Duggan, supra note 4, at 196. 
199 See Mimi E. Lyster, Child Custody: Building Parenting Agreements That 
Work 9-5 (4th ed. 2003) (stating that developing a plan for relocation in advance will save 
the “time, expense, and emotional cost” of litigation); Duggan, supra note 4, at 194–95 
(arguing that settlement is preferable to litigation in part because litigation encourages 
rancorous interaction and drains parents’ assets). 
200 See Raines, supra note 7, at 642 (citing studies that reveal greater satisfaction and 
compliance with mediated solutions); see also In re Marriage of Smith, 665 N.E.2d 1209, 
1210, 1212 (Ill. 1996) (noting that the father lost joint-custodian status when he chal-
lenged the mother’s move). 
201 See Duggan, supra note 4, at 193, 195–96, 210 (arguing that parents should settle re-
location cases because the parents are best situated to make such important decisions in 
the child’s life and because the adversarial nature of court proceedings cannot possibly 
reach a result that is in the child’s best interests). 
202 See Mason v. Coleman, 850 N.E.2d 513, 518 (Mass. 2006) (noting that joint physical 
custody requires both parents to cooperate to manage the child’s everyday life and “neces-
sitates ongoing joint scheduling and provision for supervision and transportation of chil-
dren between homes, schools, and youth activities”); Katz, supra note 9, at 112 (“It is obvi-
ous that joint custody requires unusually cooperative and financially sound parents and a 
child who is agreeable to the arrangement to make it succeed.”). 
203 See Stahl, supra note 133, at 84 (explaining that settlements are rare in relocation 
cases because parents are “rigid in their positions” and see few alternatives); Duggan, supra 
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 When a privately negotiated settlement remains elusive, formal 
mediation is a potential means of reaching a mutually agreeable solu-
tion to the issues relocation raises.204 Recently, mediation has gained 
near ubiquitous acceptance as a means of resolving custody disputes 
outside of the courtroom, and many states’ family courts may order the 
parties to attempt mediation before the case is tried.205 Alternatively, 
the parties could hire a private mediator before filing suit.206 Mediators 
are neutral third parties that are experienced in techniques to aid liti-
gants in reaching agreements on their own.207 If negotiations fail and 
the parents must go before the court, statements made during negotia-
tions usually remain confidential.208 Litigation, however, is rarely neces-
sary, as mediators are often able to overcome impasses through creative 
solutions and methods of conflict resolution.209 
IV. Finding the Best Solution to Relocation Disputes Through 
Mediation and Litigation 
 The above mentioned non-adversarial means of resolving reloca-
tion disputes could, in some instances, mitigate the difficulties courts 
and commentators have identified in joint physical custody relocation 
cases.210 Such practices could help curtail judicial discretion and pre-
vent parents from being stripped of their custodial rights through the 
adversarial process.211 When joint physical custodians file suit to relo-
cate or prevent relocation, they introduce acrimony that can destroy 
the ideally cooperative and trusting familial relationships.212 Section 
IV.A argues that family courts should order all joint physical custodians 
to mediate their relocation disputes before resorting to adversarial liti-
                                                                                                                      
note 4, at 197 (noting that relocation cases are “almost impervious to settlement”); Raines, 
supra note 7, at 645–46 (noting that although there is often less litigation involved in main-
taining joint custody relationships, the cooperation tends to break down once one parent 
decides to relocate). 
204 See Lyster, supra note 199, at 11-2 (describing mediation as a “well-accepted” 
means of resolving custody disputes). 
205 Id.; see id. at 11-10 (listing forty-two states and the District of Columbia as jurisdic-
tions where a court may order mediation before trial). 
206 Id. at 11-2, -10. 
207 See id. at 11-2 to -3 (describing role of mediators). 
208 Id. at 11-2. 
209 Id. at 11-6, -7 (explaining that mediators are skilled at reducing conflict and that 
parents reach agreements in approximately seventy percent of cases submitted to media-
tion). 
210 See infra notes 216–243 and accompanying text. 
211 See supra notes 20–184 and accompanying text. 
212 See Duggan, supra note 4, at 196–97. 
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gation.213 Section IV.B explains that when parents are unable to reach a 
solution in mediation, the family court should modify their custody 
plan, using a formulation of the best interests of the child standard that 
does not unfairly place the burden of proof on either parent and allows 
the judge, with the help of a guardian ad litem (“GAL”), to consider 
multiple factors specific to each case.214 Though such an approach as 
outlined in Section IV.B would do little to eliminate the unpredictabil-
ity or harsh results of relocation litigation, it provides a viable second-
choice method to ensure the child’s interests are protected when in-
tractable joint custodians can no longer cooperate to continue their 
current parenting plan.215 
A. Mandated Mediation 
 All states’ family courts should mandate that joint physical custodi-
ans attempt to resolve their relocation disputes through mediation be-
fore the case is submitted to adversarial litigation.216 If both parents are 
able to compromise, they will ultimately be able to find a better solu-
tion for their family than any judge could devise.217 Custodial parents 
spend large blocks of time with their children and are better situated to 
decide what is best for their children than a judge who has not had the 
opportunity to observe the child’s home-life first hand.218 If the parents 
can put aside their animosity, they could negotiate a new parenting 
plan that best fits their needs, including provisions that would not be 
obvious to a judge.219 Finally when both parents compromise to devise 
                                                                                                                      
213 See infra notes 216–243 and accompanying text. 
214 See infra notes 244–283 and accompanying text. 
215 See infra notes 250–255, 276–278 and accompanying text. 
216 See Lyster, supra note 199, at 11-10 (listing many states in which judges may order 
parents to mediate custody disputes before trial); Duggan, supra note 4, at 210 (arguing 
that courts should encourage parents to resolve relocation disputes on their own); see also 
Elrod, supra note 5, at 367–68 (explaining that parents often can reach mediated solutions 
in relocation cases and stating that mediation should be encouraged or mandated by the 
courts). 
217 See Duggan, supra note 4, at 195–97 (explaining that judges, with their limited 
knowledge of a family’s situation, must blindly guess at the best solution, whereas parents 
who know more about the child are better prepared to promote the child’s interests). 
218 See id. at 196 (“Judges always know less than parents.”). 
219 See Lyster, supra note 199, at 9-6 (suggesting creative solutions to relocation issues 
that parents may adopt in mediation); Stahl, supra note 133, at 84; Duggan, supra note 4, 
at 196 (stating that parents may make day-to-day adjustments under a negotiated custodial 
plan, but a judge must issue an inflexible order that remains in effect until the case is re-
litigated). 
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a workable parenting plan, there is no absolute winner or loser.220 Both 
parents are able to continue to develop meaningful relationships with 
their children, and neither parent will have reason to feel resentment 
towards their ex-spouse or the court for unilaterally depriving the par-
ent of custody over the child.221 
 By agreeing to an alternative custodial plan through mediation, 
both parents can continue to reap the psychological benefits of joint-
custodial plans and avoid the psychological harm of being deprived of 
parental rights at the discretion of the court.222 Commentators have 
praised the benefits of joint over sole custody, particularly for divorced 
fathers who, under sole custodial arrangements, would be expected to 
play only a limited role in their child’s life.223 Instead of occasional visi-
tation, parents with joint physical custody are able to make decisions for 
the child and take an active role in their upbringing.224 Given a sense of 
involvement and agency in the decisions affecting the child, joint cus-
todians are less likely to suffer from post-divorce depression.225 Under 
joint physical custody plans, both parents serve as primary caregivers 
for their children and are required to work together,226 likely leading to 
even greater psychological benefits.227 To be deprived of such a close 
                                                                                                                      
220 See Duggan, supra note 4, at 194–96 (suggesting that much of the harm that results 
from litigation arises from the feelings of both parents that they are engaged in an all-or-
nothing battle over their children). 
221 See id. at 196 (arguing that adversarial litigation creates entrenched feelings of ani-
mosity between the parents); Raines, supra note 7, at 642 (citing studies that show that 
parents that mediate custody plans are more likely to comply with child support obliga-
tions and less likely to initiate further adversarial proceedings). 
222 See infra notes 223–229 and accompanying text. 
223 See Kindregan, supra note 4, at 33, 34 & n.14 (citing generally Brinig & Buckley, su-
pra note 40 (recognizing that joint physical custody results in increased support for chil-
dren) and Andrew Schepard, Taking Children Seriously: Promoting Cooperative Custody After 
Divorce, 64 Tex. L. Rev. 687 (1985) (noting that some scholars have praised the benefits of 
joint custody, including greater parental cooperation and deeper parent-child relation-
ships)); Raines, supra note 7, at 627–29 (noting that joint custody arrangements result in 
better adjusted children and higher parental self-esteem). 
224 See Raines, supra note 7, at 626–27 (stating that, under joint physical custody plans, 
the child has “frequent and continuing contact with both parents” (internal quotation 
marks omitted)). 
225 See id. at 644 (citing studies that show that joint-custodial fathers had greater self-
esteem than sole custodians). 
226 See Mason v. Coleman, 850 N.E.2d 513, 518 (Mass. 2006) (stating that shared physi-
cal custody requires constant cooperation and subordination of one’s own desires to nego-
tiate solutions for scheduling activities, transportation, and supervision); Katz, supra note 
9, at 112 (stating that joint physical custody plans “require[] unusually cooperative and 
financially sound parents” to succeed). 
227 See Raines, supra note 7, at 643–44 (citing studies that show greater psychological 
benefits to children and parents when they spend more time together). 
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relationship against one’s will by the court system would impose far 
greater stress and feelings of loss than if both parents could compro-
mise on a new parental plan—even if one parent agreed to give up 
some access to the child.228 Finding a mutually agreeable solution em-
powers parents to decide their own fate and avoid the uncertainty of 
litigated outcomes.229 
 Perhaps the best solution in a relocation case is one that the courts 
would be unwilling or unable to consider.230 For instance, both parents 
may agree to move to the new location so that the current plan for 
equal division of childcare may be continued.231 Or, the relocation may 
be delayed until the child is able to enroll in or graduate from school so 
that the transition will be easier on all parties involved.232 When the par-
ents compromise to develop a new parenting plan, they are free to 
adopt these non-traditional solutions.233 Conversely, family courts, know-
ing little about the lifestyles or desires of the parents, generally decree a 
more traditional plan of sole custody vested in one parent subject to visi-
tation by the other.234 Furthermore, if one parent seeks to move to a 
new location for a job that requires long hours but will result in signifi-
cant financial gains, the parents may decide that it is best if the child 
lives primarily with the other parent, but travels (perhaps by air) for hol-
iday and weekend visits.235 On the other hand, less affluent parents may 
                                                                                                                      
228 See Stahl, supra note 133, at 84 (“[In relocation cases,] one parent usually feels a vic-
tory while the other parent feels a loss. . . . [A]nd, the child almost always suffers, no matter 
the outcome”); Duggan, supra note 4, at 196 (stating that litigation “disempower”[s] parents 
to reach a solution on their own, creating animosity between them, the lawyers, and the 
judge, and inducing the parents to rely on adversarial means to solve future disputes). 
229 See Raines, supra note 7, at 642 (finding greater compliance with, and less alien-
ation over, child support obligations when freely accepted in mediation instead of imposed 
by a court). 
230 See Weiner, supra note 20, at 1749–50 (stating that courts often try to solve reloca-
tion cases by altering visitation to accommodate the move instead of looking at other op-
tions that could allow the current parenting plan to continue, such as having both parents 
relocate to the same locale). 
231 See Lyster, supra note 199, at 9-6 (suggesting this as a possible solution to reloca-
tion disputes). 
232 Id. 
233 Cf. Duggan, supra note 4, at 196 (stating that parents have more knowledge of their 
children’s day-to-day lives and therefore can craft more flexible parenting plans than 
judges who must craft inflexible, binding custody orders based on limited information). 
234 See id. at 197, 198 (explaining that the judge must choose one parent to get custody 
of the child in relocation cases, even if both parents are equally qualified to raise the 
child). 
235 See Lyster, supra note 199, at 9-4, -6 (stating that relocation and economic changes 
will often result in alterations to child support agreements and suggesting that parents 
could alter the physical custody arrangement in favor one parent). 
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seek to have the children travel as little as possible, spending the school-
year with one parent and the summer with another.236 One parent may 
prefer to spend more time with the child when the child is older or 
younger, during school vacations, or during certain seasons of the year 
to engage in certain favorite activities together.237 Through mediation, 
parents could draft a parenting plan that best accommodates prefer-
ences and resources that may not be brought to the attention of a family 
court judge when ordering a change to the custodial plan.238 
 In addition, joint physical custodians are uniquely situated to co-
operate and devise parenting plans that best advance the child’s inter-
ests.239 As both negotiators have previously been found to be fit custo-
dial parents, they are presumed to have the best interests of their child 
at heart and to act to promote their child’s welfare.240 Unlike the judge 
who has learned about the family dynamic and the child’s lifestyle 
solely for the relocation case, the parents have lived with the child for 
long periods of time and intimately know the child’s desires, motiva-
tions, and needs.241 Furthermore, the parents have hitherto successfully 
maintained a parenting arrangement whereby they exercised equal 
control over the life of their child, often communicating with each 
other about important and mundane decisions, as well as coordinating 
the child’s day-to-day activities.242 The parents in joint physical custody 
relocation cases thus have a proven track record of working together to 
find solutions to problems affecting the life of their child and would 
likely be able to find a mutually agreeable resolution to the problem of 
relocation as well.243 
                                                                                                                      
236 See id. at 9-11 (stating that rotating residences to fit the school calendar is a popular 
choice of custodial plan). 
237 See Donald T. Saposnek, Mediating Child Custody Disputes: A Strategic Ap-
proach 146–47 (rev. ed. 1998) (suggesting schedules in which the child spends a certain 
holiday with the parent who attaches greater significance to the occasion, alternates yearly 
between houses, or celebrates the holiday at both locations separately). 
238 See Lyster, supra note 199, at 9-6 (listing several mediated solutions to relocation 
disputes); Duggan, supra note 4, at 196. 
239 See infra notes 240–243 and accompanying text. 
240 See Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 68 (2000) (“[T]here is a presumption that fit 
parents act in the best interests of their children.”). 
241 See Duggan, supra note 4, at 196 (stating that the judge knows only what was pre-
sented at the hearing—far less than the parents know about their own children). 
242 See Mason, 850 N.E.2d at 518 (stating that a joint physical custody plan requires par-
ents to be able to cooperate when organizing “a variety of the details of everyday life”). 
243 See id. (noting that joint physical custodians must realize that they will sometimes be 
required to place the interests of the child and the other parent above their own to ensure 
the success of the plan). 
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B. Litigation as the Second-Best Alternative 
 Court mandated mediation, however, may not work for all parents 
in all cases.244 Several commentators have remarked that parents in re-
location cases are often unable to come to a fair resolution on their 
own.245 They are simply too entrenched in their positions, seeking ei-
ther unfettered freedom to relocate or rigid maintenance of the status 
quo.246 In particularly rancorous disputes, or in situations in which the 
parties cannot easily travel for visitation, the parties may not be able to 
cooperate or find a workable solution that allows both parents to play 
an active role in raising the child.247 In such cases, it would ultimately 
be necessary for the family courts to serve as neutral arbiters to deter-
mine which parent should choose the child’s primary residence.248 If 
possible, the parents should continue as joint legal custodians, and the 
court should allow for the child to spend significant blocks of time visit-
ing the nonresidential parent to continue their relationship.249 
 For relocation cases that involve great distances, the judge may be 
forced to choose one party with whom the child will live during the 
school year and another party with whom the child will spend school 
holidays.250 Thus, one parent will spend significantly less time raising 
the child than if responsibility was distributed equally.251 When both 
parents want to provide at least half of the child’s care, such an out-
come will be viewed by one party as “losing” the case.252 Whereas this 
win or lose mentality is poisonous to an otherwise healthy joint-
                                                                                                                      
244 See infra notes 245–248 and accompanying text. 
245 Stahl, supra note 133, at 84 (stating that relocation cases are difficult to negotiate 
because both parents refuse to see any alternatives to their settled plans to move or stay); 
Duggan, supra note 4, at 197 (stating that relocation are often “impervious to settlement”). 
246 See Stahl, supra note 133, at 84 (stating that parents frame relocation cases in abso-
lute terms as a win or loss of custody, feeling that they have no other options but to abide 
by their desire to move or stay). 
247 See Duggan, supra note 4, at 197 (noting that relocation cases will not settle when 
one parent commits to relocating, leaving her unable to compromise when negotiating a 
new custodial plan). 
248 See id. (stating that parents “look to a family court judge to force one of their 
hands” when negotiations in relocation cases fail); see also Lyster, supra note 199, at 11-14, 
16-9 (noting that binding arbitration is an alternative method of reaching a decision, but 
that only a few states allow arbitration in custody disputes). 
249 See supra notes 222–227 and accompanying text (describing the benefits of joint-
custodial plans). 
250 See Saposnek, supra note 237, at 282 (noting that school-aged children must stay in 
one home while school is in session, but could spend school breaks with the other parent). 
251 See id. 
252 See Stahl, supra note 133, at 84 (noting that parents usually regard the results of re-
location cases as a victory or loss). 
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custodial relationship, an adversarial contest is the only appropriate 
solution after mediation has failed.253 When parents have refused to 
cooperate when planning for the future, a joint physical custody plan, 
which requires constant interactions and negotiations between the par-
ents, may no longer be feasible because of the animosity that has arisen 
from the proposed relocation.254 The judge must then alter the custo-
dial plan to provide for less parental bargaining and compromise, in-
evitably granting one parent rights superior to the other.255 
 As in all jurisdictions previously discussed, the judge should focus 
on the best interests of the child when deciding which parent should 
determine the child’s residence.256 This standard must be framed in a 
manner that does not apply an a priori presumption in favor of either 
relocation or maintaining the status quo.257 Presuming that the child’s 
best interests are always best served by either staying in the same com-
munity or by relocating would ignore the complexities of each individ-
ual case.258 Furthermore, applying such a presumption would be un-
fairly prejudicial against a joint custodian who has exercised equal 
responsibility for the child and thus should be placed on equal footing 
with the other when assessing who will best promote the child’s wel-
fare.259 If, however, in reality, the joint custodians divided childcare re-
sponsibilities unequally, the parent that has provided a clear majority of 
the child’s care, as in a sole custody case, should be appointed the pri-
mary residential parent, unless the other parent shows that it would be 
better for the child to live with the parent who has hitherto provided 
less care—a difficult burden to meet.260 Such a rule would promote 
                                                                                                                      
 
253 See supra notes 159–186, 248 and accompanying text. 
254 See Mason, 850 N.E.2d at 518 (stating that a successful joint physical custody plan 
requires parents to constantly cooperate when organizing the child’s day-to-day life); In re 
Marriage of Smith, 665 N.E.2d 1209, 1210, 1212 (Ill. 1996) (noting that the trial judge, 
having found that the parents’ joint physical custody relationship “had deteriorated to the 
point of complete acrimony,” awarded sole custody to the mother). 
255 See Mason, 850 N.E.2d at 518 (noting that joint physical custodians must cooperate 
on a regular basis); Smith, 665 N.E.2d at 1210, 1212 (describing a situation in which sole 
custody was preferable to joint physical custody due to “acrimony” between the parents). 
256 See supra notes 20–127 and accompanying text. 
257 See Debele, supra note 4, at 76–77 (explaining how a presumption in favor of either 
parent is unfair to the other). 
258 See id. 
259 See Jaramillo v. Jaramillo, 823 P.2d 299, 304, 309 (N.M. 1991) (holding that, under a 
joint custody decree, parents have equal decision-making power and therefore stand on 
equal footing in relocation cases, even if one parent assumes a majority of everyday care). 
260 See Burgess v. Burgess (In re Marriage of Burgess), 913 P.2d 473, 476, 482 (Cal. 
1996) (holding that a parent with a majority of custodial responsibility may relocate with 
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predictability and the stable maintenance of a close relationship be-
tween the child and its primary caregiver.261 
 When both parents divide childcare responsibilities approximately 
equally, the judge should take a two-pronged approach to decide the 
case.262 First, the judge should determine if the distance of the parent’s 
move necessitates a change in the custodial plan.263 If it is possible to 
maintain the current joint physical custody plan, even if it would re-
quire some increased travel time, the case should be dismissed so that 
the child is still assured of consistent contact with both parents.264 For 
instance, if a parent was planning on moving only an hour’s journey 
from the other, daily commutes would still be possible, and longer 
journeys would be feasible if made only once a week.265 In close cases, 
the judge should consider if fewer journeys with longer stays at each 
location would allow joint custodians to continue the equal division of 
responsibility.266 For such plans to be feasible, the judge must ensure 
that the children would be able to commute to school from both resi-
dences.267 Additionally, the judge must consider the financial resources 
of the parents and the ease with which they can provide transportation 
for the child.268 
 When one parent seeks to move so far away from the other such 
that an equal sharing of childcare responsibilities would be impossible, 
the judge should engage in the second prong of the inquiry— identify-
ing which parent is better suited to provide a majority of the child’s 
                                                                                                                      
the child unless the other parent shows that it is “essential or expedient” for the child’s 
welfare to prevent relocation). 
261 See id. at 476, 480–81 (explaining that requiring a relocating sole custodian to show 
that the move is necessary would undermine the public policy of preventing costly litiga-
tion to “micromanage” everyday decisions and that the sole custodian should usually be 
allowed to relocate with the child). 
262 See infra notes 263–275 and accompanying text. 
263 See supra notes 137–158 and accompanying text. 
264 See Raines, supra note 7, at 626–27, 651 (explaining how joint physical custody plans 
“assure a child of frequent and continuing contact with both parents” and that children 
experience great stress and feelings of loss when one parent decides to relocate (internal 
quotation marks omitted)). 
265 See Burgess, 913 P.2d at 478–79 (affirming the trial court’s decision that the mother 
could relocate with the children when the distance between her new home and the fa-
ther’s home would be an “easy commute,” allowing for frequent visits). 
266 Cf. Lyster, supra note 199, at 9-6 (noting that transportation options in mediated 
solutions will vary depending upon how far apart the parents live). 
267 Cf. Saposnek, supra note 237, at 282 (noting that, when parents live far apart, chil-
dren must spend the school year at one home). 
268 Cf. Lyster, supra note 199, at 7-10 to -11 (noting that the transportation schedule 
in mediated solutions may depend on the financial resources of the parents or on which 
parent has vehicle access). 
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care during the school year—by balancing the move’s benefits and det-
riments to the child.269 Because the pros and cons will be different in 
every case, the judge must be given wide discretion to consider all po-
tential factors; strictly enumerated statutory or common-law lists of re-
levant factors are impractical.270 For instance, the benefits of relocation 
may include being closer to family, enjoying a higher standard of living, 
or enrolling in a better school.271 Detriments may include moving away 
from family and friends (including the nonrelocating parent), the 
stress of leaving a familiar locale, or a decreased standard of living in 
the new location.272 Any factors deemed relevant should primarily af-
fect the child, not truly be benefits or burdens to the parents that are 
only tenuously attributed to the child’s wellbeing.273 In addition, the 
family court judge should take the clearly expressed preferences of the 
child into account.274 Ultimately, the judge must determine by a pre-
ponderance of the evidence which residence will best promote the 
child’s interests and declare the parent living in that locale the primary 
residential parent.275 
 This proposed framework, if put into practice, would be as unpre-
dictable for litigants as many states’ current standards that leave child 
custody determinations to the discretion of family court judges.276 If, 
however, one imagines litigation as only the second-best alternative in-
stead of a default means of resolving relocation disputes, this unpre-
dictability is beneficial.277 Knowing that their dispute will be resolved by 
balancing many factors tailored to the specific case, litigants and their 
                                                                                                                      
269 See Tropea v. Tropea, 665 N.E.2d 145, 150–51 (N.Y. 1996) (stating that all relocation 
disputes should be resolved “with due consideration of all the relevant facts and circum-
stances” by weighing the move’s harms and benefits to discover “what outcome is most 
likely to serve the best interests of the child”); Saposnek, supra note 237, at 282 (noting 
that the child must spend the school year in one home, but may live with the other parent 
during school breaks). 
270 See Sara P. v. Richard T., 670 N.Y.S.2d 964, 966–67 (Fam. Ct. 1998) (adding relevant 
factors to relocation analysis not considered in precedent). 
271 See Yannas v. Frondistou-Yannas, 481 N.E.2d 1153, 1158 (Mass. 1985) (noting that 
relation will benefit the children and their mother financially, socially, and educationally). 
272 See Connelly v. Connelly, 644 So. 2d 789, 797 (La. Ct. App. 1994); Raines, supra note 
7, at 649–54 (describing the emotional traumas suffered by children during relocation). 
273 See Mason, 850 N.E.2d at 519 (explaining that an advantage to one joint physical 
custodian is less relevant to the child’s welfare than an advantage to a sole custodian); see 
also supra note 90 and accompanying text. 
274 Debele, supra note 4, at 116–17. 
275 See supra notes 128–184 and accompanying text. 
276 See supra notes 20–184 and accompanying text. 
277 See infra notes 278–279 and accompanying text. 
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counsel would be unable to predict the outcome.278 Hoping to avoid 
the appreciable risk of losing their custodial rights altogether, parents 
will be encouraged to compromise during mediation, perhaps giving 
up some time with the child for the assurance of retaining the type of 
relationship most important to each parent.279 
 To ensure that the best interests of the child are served, the court 
should use GALs.280 As experts in child development and child custody 
disputes, they are able to suggest to the judge what parenting plan 
would truly be in a specific child’s best interests.281 The widespread use 
of GALs would also mitigate concerns that judges are ill-equipped to 
investigate the day-to-day needs and interactions of the family.282 The 
GAL is not limited by courtroom procedure for interviewing persons 
with knowledge of the child’s situation, and the GAL is able to spend 
significant amounts of time observing the child on a daily basis.283 
Conclusion 
 When a joint physical custodian relocates only a short distance, 
and the parenting plan can be maintained with only minor alterations, 
the parents and family courts should endeavor to maintain the joint 
physical custody plan. When a parent exercising joint physical custody 
seeks to relocate a long distance from the other parent, however, the 
continued operation of the existing parenting plan is impossible. Ide-
ally, the parents will be able to negotiate a solution to this conundrum 
so that they both can maintain strong relationships with the child. 
Thus, all family courts should require the parents to attempt to craft a 
new parenting plan through mediation. Only after a sustained failure 
to find a solution through mediation should the family court judge be-
                                                                                                                      
278 See Debele, supra note 4, at 78 (stating that the “‘best interests of the child’ is an 
amorphous concept” that is difficult for judges and parents “to flesh out and apply”). 
279 See Raines, supra note 7, at 654–55 (describing the financial and emotional risks of 
entering into the adversarial process). 
280 See Katz, supra note 9, at 109 (explaining the fact-finding powers of GALs and their 
expertise in formulating parenting plans to promote the child’s healthy development); 
Muhlhauser, supra note 190, at 639–40 (noting that GALs may make recommendations to 
the court or participate in proceedings). 
281 See Katz, supra note 9, at 109 (describing GALs as experts in sociology, psychology, 
and childcare). 
282 See id. (explaining how GALs can elicit information more easily than judges); Dug-
gan, supra note 4, at 196 (explaining how judges receive only limited information about 
the child through hearings). 
283 Compare Katz, supra note 9, at 109 (stating that GALs can interview people not pre-
sent in the courtroom, observe the child at home, and interact with both parents), with 
Duggan, supra note 4, at 196 (describing the limits of a judge’s fact-finding capacity). 
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gin the formal litigation process through the appointment of a GAL. 
Upon receiving the report of the GAL, the judge should then decide, 
based on the best interests of the child, which parent is to become the 
primary residential parent and which parent must be forced to accept a 
more circumscribed role in childcare. There should be no presump-
tion for or against allowing relocation of the child, but rather the deci-
sion must be made by balancing the various benefits and harms that 
relocation will impose in each individual case. Although this method of 
adjudication is notoriously unpredictable and will ultimately deprive 
one party of extensive parental rights, the parents’ failure to cooperate 
during mediation or to devise a more flexible custodial plan necessi-
tates ending the joint-custodial agreement and deciding in favor of 
whichever parent can provide a better life for the child. 
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